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Exchange of Frank Opinions at 12th Korea-Japan Forum

The 12th Korea-Japan Forum, which was held in Shimonoseki, Japan, from September 13-15, served as an occasion for the exchange of frank opinions between Korean and Japanese leaders from various sectors, including politics, business, academia, and the media. This was my third time as a participant in the Korea-Japan Forum. Of note, it was at this year’s forum that I heard the frankest opinions expressed by both sides. Especially, it was impressive that the Japanese side raised questions about pertinent issues of Korean society and diplomacy in an almost aggressive manner. This was quite a contrast to the attitudes of previous Japanese participants who showed restraint in preferring to avoid delicate issues, mindful of the legacies of our modern history. One participant dubbed this a ‘reversal of offense and defense.’ It showed that Korean society has been changing dramatically enough to cause concern among the Japanese, on the one hand, and that the two countries have developed enough trust to raise issues without reservation and to seek to dispel doubt about each other, on the other hand.

The presence of former Japanese Minister of State, Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo added to the prestige of the Forum. As the first speaker of the Japanese side on the afternoon of September 13, he remarked that Japan should show self-restraint and a spirit of tolerance in regard to issues about the legacies of our two countries’ modern history. This was a positive and welcome view in the eyes of the Korean side. Responding to Japanese concerns over the notable political and social changes in Korea, Representative Lee Nak-yon called on the Japanese side to consider such change as an effort to revamp the post-war system of Korea, which has been overly dependent on the United States and placed too much emphasis on economic growth under the Cold War structure, just as Japan has addressed its so-called “5-Year System (55-nen taisei).” The Japanese side has paid keen attention to the Korean government-led efforts to clear up the legacies related to pro-Japanese activities during Japan’s colonial rule. Although the Korean side explained this as a domestic political movement and transitional process, the Japanese side did not hide their embarrassment and regret at Korea’s fact-finding investigation of pro-Japanese activities, as if seeking to condemn Japan. Indeed, they advised the Korean side that anti-Japanese sentiments in Korea could provoke nationalism in Japan.

On the morning of September 14, a Korean speaker on diplomacy and security issues emphasized the need for Korea, Japan and the United States to cooperate closely and at the same time to promote multilateral efforts in Northeast Asia. By this, he meant that cooperation among Korea, Japan and the United States is not necessarily exclusive. Meanwhile, the Japanese side emphasized strengthening of the Japan-United States alliance, and admitted to having a sense of insecurity and uncertainty about Korea’s optimism toward China and appeasement of North Korea. The Korean side stressed that Korea is not inclined toward China, while cooperation with North Korea is a means of settling the North Korean nuclear issue. Both sides agreed to some extent that the image of China has been somewhat exaggerated, and pointed out that the Korean people have started to cool down due to the controversy over the history of Goguryeo and China’s nationalistic behavior at the Asian Games. The Japanese side was also more critical of South Korea’s failure to control its nuclear materials than North Korea’s nuclear problem. They also raised questions about the responsibility for a more transparent explanation by the South Korean authorities. To this, the Korean participants repeatedly emphasized that the incidents regarding nuclear materials in South Korea were disclosed as part of a process of improving its cooperation with the IAEA and were not the result of any rejection of the IAEA, and that South Korea has absolutely no intention to develop nuclear weapons. Especially, the Japanese participants expressed that any extraction of nuclear materials might have been a strategic reaction to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea. Regarding this, the Korean participants explained that the extraction of nuclear materials was conducted long before the start of discussions on the withdrawal of the USFK.

As for concluding a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA), the Japanese participants showed a highly progressive attitude. They said that Korea and Japan should play a leading role in promoting regional integration in Northeast Asia, and that an FTA is indispensable for this purpose. The Korean participants agreed with their Japanese counterparts, but frankly noted the prevalence of negative views of Korea’s business sector because of the trade deficit with Japan and a lesser competitive edge in technology. They said that the impact of an FTA would be different according to individual sectors because the two countries have many common industries that compete against each other. However, the Japanese side strongly emphasized that early conclusion of an FTA would be beneficial, although the timing of conclusion and contents of the agreement would be negotiable. They also pointed out that there would be more losses than gains if an agreement is not signed in a timely manner. This discussion clearly showed that an FTA is no longer a matter of lip service or a political pledge, but has become an issue to be negotiated in earnest.

In the final session of the Forum, on exchanges between Korea and Japan, both sides agreed that the two countries now need a comprehensive approach through regional cooperation that goes beyond simple exchange. In particular, the two sides agreed on the importance of young people’s shift in their perceptions of each other. They also discussed the need for an increase in the number of students studying in each other’s country and the exchange of high school students, as well as a correct understanding about the young generation’s way of thinking. The participants agreed that opportunities for strategic dialogue, not restricted to cultural exchange, should be increased between Korea and Japan.

On the afternoon of September 15, the last day of the Forum, the participants viewed the attractions of Shimonoseki under the guidance of Councillor Yoshimasa Hayashi from the local area, and enjoyed original swellfish cuisine at the home of the swellfish delicacy. I could clearly see the sincere affection and interest that Japanese lawmakers have for their constituency.

One of the impressive aspects of the composition of the delegations for the 12th Forum was that the Japanese side included a large number of politicians. It was evident that they intended to make the most of the Korea-Japan Forum as an occasion to build a dialogue channel at a time when there was a major change in the Korean members of the League of Korean and Japanese Parliamentarians, as former key members, such as Kim Jong-pil, have been replaced by new-generation members. On the other hand, the Korean delegation included a younger generation and individuals with progressive views, reflecting the strengthened position of progressive forces. A progressive figure, who previously had a negative perception about the Forum, confessed that he was impressed by the fact that the Forum served as an opportunity to exchange frank opinions and to freely get acquainted with their counterparts.

With the support of the Korea Foundation, steering committee members of the Korea-Japan Forum autonomously decide on the agenda and participants in close cooperation with the Japanese side. Certain members of the delegation are changed each year and younger-generation participants are included as well. Such autonomy, openness, and dynamism are basic strengths of the Forum.

To make the Korea-Japan Forum even more successful, I hope that there will be strengthened efforts to hold regular sectional gatherings in Korea to exchange opinions and to develop a strategic agenda for future cooperation with Japan. Forum participants in fact are subjected to strict time constraints when they have to discuss a wide range of issues in just two days once a year. For example, a Korea-Japan dialogue for security and strategy could be created in connection with the existing Forum. In addition, I hope that a mechanism to forward the discussion results and proposals from the Forum to policymakers in the field of diplomacy and security can be institutionalized. This is because many things, which would not be raised through official channels, are discussed in an open manner at the Forum, where mutual trust has been developed over the more than ten years of annual sessions and thus provides a venue for the exchange of frank opinions. And many of the views are worthy of attention from more people, especially high-ranking policymakers.

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