Due to declining fertility rates and rising life expectancy, Korea’s population structure is undergoing
rapid changes, more so than any other country in the world. The decrease in the nation’s total
population is leading to a drastic demographic transition which is characterized by a shrinking labor
force and rising dependency ratio, posing a serious problem for Korean society.
Rising life expectancy is good news, but falling birth rates and the growing trend to avoid marriage
portend a gloomy future with an increasing burden of supporting the elderly population.
Traditionally, Koreans regarded having many children
as one of the five blessings. The expectation that
their children would support them in old age was
greater than the burden of child-rearing and having many
offspring was thought to bring prosperity to the family.
Demographic Changes and Government Policies
From 1955, shortly after the end of the Korean War,
the nation experienced a surge in the birth rate, leading
to the so-called baby boom. Statistics show that in 1960,
the total fertility rate (TFR), the average number of children
born to a woman during her childbearing years of 15
to 49, reached 6.0. But due to the dire state of the economy
and a food shortage, people lived in destitution and many
starved to death during the spring lean season. To tackle
the problem, the government introduced a population control
program in 1962 as a national policy priority by implementing
extensive family planning measures. This proved
to be immensely effective and eventually the public came
to regard having just two children as a virtue. By 1983,
the TFR had dropped to the population replacement level
of 2.1 (the fertility rate at which the population remains
unchanged from generation to generation, 2.1 children per
woman at present after factoring in early deaths).
As the TFR reached the replacement level, demographers
debated whether the family planning projects should
be continued. Opinion was divided. Some argued that the
population control program was no longer necessary since
the population had been successfully reduced, while others
contended that if it was discontinued, the TFR could
spring back up again. The fertility rate did, in fact, show a
slight increase, but while the government remained undecided
due to future unpredictability, the country was hit by
the Asian financial crisis in 1997, which led to a significant
downward trend in fertility. By 2005, the TFR had dipped to
1.03, an unprecedented level and a shocking forewarning
that the Korean population will be reduced by half in the
future.
Low Fertility and Aging Population
Korea is a small country with an overflowing population.
It is the third most densely populated country in the world
after Bangladesh and Taiwan. Then why is a low birth rate
a problem?
Economic development, improvement in living stan
dards, and advances in medicine have significantly
boosted the average life expectancy of Koreans in recent
decades. In 1970, the average life span of Koreans was
58.7 years for men and 65.6 years for women. It was the
custom then to hold a big birthday party for one's parents
when they turned 60. But in 2015, the average life
expectancy of Koreans was 79.0 years for men and 85.2
years for women, an increase of roughly 20 years, and
it will continue to rise in the years ahead. Now, instead
of the big 60, people hold big celebrations for the 80th
birthday. As of 2015, there were 3,159 Koreans aged 100
or older; it seems the country is fast approaching the
“centenarian age.” The average life expectancy of Korean
men is 1.1 years higher than the OECD average and
that of Korean women 1.9 years higher.
The youth population refers to those below 15, the
age at which economic activity is legally possible, while
the elderly population is defined as people over 65, generally
considered the full retirement age. The two age
groups depend on the nation’s wealth created by the
economically active population between 15 and 65. The
child dependency ratio is the percentage of the child
population divided by the economically active population,
an indicator of the number of children supported
by one working-age person. Similarly, the aged dependency
ratio is the percentage of the elderly population
divided by the economically active population, which
indicates the number of elderly people per workingage
person. A high child dependency ratio means that
the economically active population will increase in the
future, while a high aged dependency ratio suggests an
increase in the population requiring economic support.
As of 2015, Korea’s child dependency ratio was estimated
at 18.8 and aged dependency ratio 17.5. Statistics
Korea has forecast, however, that the two figures will be
reversed in 2017 and that by 2065, the child dependency
ratio will remain virtually unchanged at 20.0 while the
aged dependency ratio will soar to 88.6.
Korea’s population structure has been represented
by a stable pyramid with a large youth population at
the base supporting the elderly population that tapers
toward the top, but it is gradually shifting to an inverted
pyramid. The reversal is not a problem that appeared
overnight, but a prediction that is starting to become
a reality. This year marks the turning point, and hence
there has been a lot of media coverage recently about
the beginning of the population reversal and the population
cliff. As of 2015, the economically productive
population was 37.44 million; this is expected to drop
sharply to 20.62 million by 2065, or 55.5 percent of the
current number. The nation’s population structure is
undergoing rapid changes in a very short period of
time, posing a great challenge in establishing policies
to effectively address the issues of low fertility and population
aging that developed countries in the West are
already experiencing.
In 2065, the elderly are expected to account for 42.5
percent of the total population and the young for only 9.6
percent. By that time, economic support for the elderly
will become a grave social problem and a critical
national policy task.
The year 2017 marks the beginning of the population reversal in Korea. Active discussions are
under way to establish policies that take into account sociocultural changes beyond promoting
childbirth and welfare for the elderly.
Economic and Sociocultural Approaches
Up until 1970, over one million babies were born
each year in Korea, but the number has been falling
ever since. In 2015, the number of newborns totaled
438,400. By 2029, the number of births and deaths is
expected to be roughly the same at 410,000; from 2031,
deaths will outnumber births and the Korean population
will start to decrease. In 2065, the elderly are
expected to account for 42.5 percent of the total population
and the young only 9.6 percent. By this time,
economic support for the elderly will become a grave
social problem and a critical national policy task. The
current 15-year-olds who are growing up in an era of
rapidly changing perceptions about marriage and childbirth
will be joining the aging population then. Back in
the industrialization era, it may have been possible to
reduce the birth rate with campaigns like “Have just
two children and raise them well.” Such an approach is
no longer viable in bringing the birth rate back up again.
Education and industry in Korea have developed in
line with the current population, and yet unemployment
is rising due to a lack of jobs. As the number of births
continues to fall, educational facilities will become
redundant, leading to a loss of related jobs. Some elementary
schools have already been forced to shut down
due to a lack of students and universities are likely to
face the same problem in the near future. A shrinking
population means dwindling purchasing power and
economic stagnation. Businesses will not find it easy
to maintain their current manpower, let alone hire new
recruits, causing serious repercussions for economic
activity and structure. The growing elderly population
will exacerbate the problem.
Today’s youths who are reluctant to have children
will grow old someday. Care for them after retirement
will fall on the government, or more specifically, taxes
collected from the working-age population.
Not having
children may be an individual choice, but from the
perspective of state administration, it is a form of egoism
because in old age, childless people are supported
by taxes paid by other people’s children. In addition,
a decrease in the economically active population
will result in declining tax revenues, which means the
government will have to impose heavier taxes on the
shrinking workforce. This is likely to spawn conflict
between the young and the old. As a buffer measure,
the government will have to resort to immigrants from
developing countries to fill the labor shortage.
From a demographer’s perspective, the future looks
bleak. But unlike animals, humans cannot live on food
alone; they create civilization and culture, and ponder
not just economic issues, but the meaning of life
as well. Demographic shifts, or changes in population
structure, lead to changes in human culture. In Chinese
characters, the word "population" literally means
“a person’s mouth." It implies that people engage in
economic activity so that they can eat and live well. The
mouth is the opening through which food enters the
body and words are spoken. If food is the economy, then
language is culture. To address the demographic challenges
of the future, the nation needs policies taking
into account sociocultural changes as well as the economy.